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IS THE GULF OF TARANTO AN HISTORIC BAY?*
Natalino Ronzitti**
I. INTRODUCTION

Italy's shores bordering the Ionian Sea, particularly the segment joining Cape Spartivento to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, form
a coastline which is deeply indented and cut into. The Gulf of
Taranto is the major indentation along the Ionian coast. The line
joining the two points of the entrance of the Gulf (Alice PointCape Santa Maria di Leuca) is approximately sixty nautical miles
in length. At its mid-point, the line joining Alice Point to Cape Santa
Maria di Leuca is approximately sixty-three nautical miles from the
innermost low-water line of the Gulf of Taranto coast.
The Gulf of Taranto is a juridical bay because it meets the semicircular test set up by Article 7(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 1 Indeed, the waters
embodied by the Gulf cover an area larger than that of the semicircle whose diameter is the line Alice Point-Cape Santa Maria
di Leuca (the line joining the mouth of the Gulf).
On April 26, 1977, Italy enacted a Decree causing straight
baselines to be drawn along the coastline of the Italian Peninsula. 2
A straight baseline, about sixty nautical miles long, was drawn along
the entrance of the Gulf of Taranto between Cape Santa Maria di
Leuca and Alice Point. The 1977 Decree justified the drawing of
such a line by proclaiming the Gulf of Taranto an historic bay.3 The
Decree, however, did not specify the grounds upon which the Gulf
of Taranto was declared an historic bay.
Even the report of the Commission which drafted the 1977
• This article has been written in conjunction with a research project sponsored
by the Italian Ministry of Public Education.
•• Professor of International Law and Director, "D. Anzilotti" Institute of International Law, University of Pisa.
1. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea].
2. The Italian Decree of April 26, 1977 on straight baselines is reprinted in II
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 147-51 (F. Durante & w.
Rodino eds. 1979).
3. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2,
art. 1 at 147-48.
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Decree fails to mention the titles which might justify the proclamation of the Gulf of Taranto as an historic bay. Instead, the report
seems to imply that Italy has always exerted control over the Gulf
by virtue of the Gulfs deep indentation into Italian territory.'
Moreover, the Commission quotes previous examples of bays which
have been enclosed since the Second World War, notwithstanding
the fact that their mouths are wider than twenty-four nautical miles,
the maximum length allowed for enclosing a juridical bay. 5
The relevant passage of the report, which is still unpublished,
is worth quoting. After recalling Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,6 the
Commission proceeds as follows:
The provision [Article 7(6)] does not make it clear what is meant
by historic bay; neither does an examination of legal literature or
the present practice of States give sufficient elements for a definite
conclusion.
It is true that the historic bay is defined in the literature of
international law as one over which the coastal State can claim
to have exercised exclusive rights over a considerable length of
time; the classical examples usually cited are the Chaleur,
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, among others. However the
examples are not exhaustive and it is evident that when the coasts
of a bay belong to only one State, that State will normally have
control over it.
The examples of enclosed bays with an entrance more than
24 nautical miles in width which must therefore be considered as
"historic", are legion. Some examples are Peter the Great Bay,
enclosed by the Soviet Union in 1957, the Gulf of Gabes enclosed
by Tunisia, all the enormously wide-entranced bays on the River
Plate enclosed by Argentina and Uraguay in 1966, all the Egyptian
bays and gulfs closed by Egypt in 1951, all the bays of Gabon
enclosed in 1966 and 1968, the bays of Guinea enclosed in 1964,
and the Bay of Ungwana closed by Kenya in 1960, the Panama
Gulf closed by Panama in 1956 etc. 7

Clearly, the notion of an historic bay is highly controversial.
In fact, at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
4. Report of the Commission on Straight Baselines (1977) (unpublished document of
the Italian Government).
5. Id.
6. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6).
7. See Report of the Commission on Straight Baselines, supra note 4.
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Sea the participating states were not able to reach a viable definition. However, it must be recognized that the notion of an historic
bay is linked with a time element. It is a time element which is
reflected by both the exercise of sovereign rights over the bay by
the coastal state and the acquiescence, or at least the toleration
of third states.8 This premise based on time brings one closer to
ascertaining whether the Gulf of Taranto meets with the criteria
defining an historic bay. The following analysis illustrates this point.
Since the notion of an historic bay is linked with the element
of time, one must first ascertain whether Italy has effectively
exercised exclusive rights over the Gulf of Taranto, without
challenge by third states, for a considerable period of time. The
length of time proposed for this discussion (in relation to both the
exercise of sovereignty by the coastal state and the practice of
interested states) is that from the proclamation of the Kingdom of
Italy in 1861, to the present day. This period will be divided into
four segments: (1) from 1861 to the entry into force of the Italian
Code of Navigation (1861-1942); (2) from 1942 to August 14, 1974,
and the enactment of the Law amending Article 2 of the Italian
Code of Navigation to extend the Italian territorial sea to twelve
nautical miles (1942-1974); (3) from the 1974 Law amending the
Italian Code of Navigation to the 1977 Decree which ·proclaimed
the Gulf of Taranto an historic bay (1974-1977); and (4) from the entry
into force of the 1977 Decree to the present (1977-1985). 9

II. THE GULF OF TARANTO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A.

1861-1942

During this period Italy did not establish a consistent distance
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. The extension of
8. Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Overview 11 SYR.
J. INT'L L. & COM. 211 (1984).
9. It is unnecessary to trace the status of the Gulf of Taranto back before the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy (1861), since the length of time that will be scrutinized
is fairly extensive. It is worth noting, however, that at the time of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies, the Kingdom's territorial sea was measured according to the custom of the cannon
shot rule. A bay could be closed only if the body of water thus enclosed met the requisites
of the cannon shot rule. No exception was made for the Gulf of Taranto, which was mentioned only as a mere geographical expression and not as an example of an historic bay.
See C.M. MOSCHETTI, I IL CODICE MARITTIMO DEL 1871 DI MICHELE DE JORIO PER IL REGNO DI
NAPOLI: INTRODUZIONE E TESTO ANNOTATI 229 (Giannini ed.1979): C.M. MOSCHETTI II IL CODICE
MARITTIMO DEL 1871 DI MICHELE DE JORIO PER IL REGNO DI NAPOLI: INTRODUZIONE E TESTO ANNOTATI 612 (Giannini ed. 1979).
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the territorial sea varied according to the terms of legislation in
effect at any given time. For example, Act No. 16 of 16 June
1912-which enacted rules on the passage of merchant ships
through Italian coastal waters- fixed the breadth of the territorial
sea at ten miles. 10 The Royal Decree of 6 August 1914 (No. 798) on
the rights and duties of the neutral powers in wartime established
a six mile territorial sea limit. 11 Curiously enough, customs laws
of January 26, 1896, employed the kilometer and not the nautical
mile as the unit for measuring the territorial sea. The limit was
thus established at the kilometers equivalent of 10 nautical miles. 12
None of the above laws quote the Gulf of Taranto as an historic
bay. Even the Decree of 13 June 1915 (No. 899) set up no special
proviso for the Gulf of Taranto. 13 For security reasons, the latter
Decree prohibited, inter alia, anchoring and stopping of foreign merchant ships in the Italian territorial waters of the Ionian Sea,
between Santa Maria di Leuca and Capo Passero. 14 The territorial
sea, however, remained at ten miles according to the Law of 16 June
1912 (No. 612). 15 The same considerations apply to the Neutrality

10. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2,
at 1. Cf Pagliano, Mare Territoriale e Transito Inoffensivo (A proposito di un recente disegno
di legge), 5 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 551 (1910).
11. Sandiford, fl Mare Territoriale Secondo il Diritto Positivo Italiano, RIVISTA
MARITTIMA, (Apr. 1927) at 89.
12. Id. at 94.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See SIOI-CNR, III LA PRASS! ITALIANA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE SECONDA SERIE
(1887-1918) 1379-82 (1979). Article 4 of the June 13, 1915 Decree prohibited any nightime
fishing activities in the territorial waters of the Ionian Sea. 160 GAZ. UFF. ITAL. (June 26,
1915) at 3983. The Decree of Aug. 24, 1915 (No. 1312) added further restrictions forbidding
navigation in the waters within the line between Cape Trionto and Torre Madonna dell'Alto.
220 GAZ. UFF. ITAL. (Sept. 4, 1915) at 5216. Whether during the day or night, fishing in the
waters lying landward of the line joining Cape Trianto and Cape Santa Maria di Leuca was
also prohibited. Both lines enclosed a body of water which fell far outside the limit of the
territorial sea. However, the wording of the August 24, 1915 Decree does not make it clear
whether the prohibitions applied only to Italian vessels or those of foreign nationals as well.
However, the former view seems to be the correct view to be inferred from other Italian
wartime Decrees. For instance, the Decree of December 23, 1915, (No. 1880) 6 GAZ. UFF.
ITAL. (Jan.10, 1916) at 127, extended the prohibition set up by the Decree of August 24, 1915
to the waters landward of the line Cape Trionto-Fiumara Assi. Since the local fisherman
could be compensated for the loss they met in observing the prohibition, one can argue that
it applied only to Italian vessels. In fact, the terms "ships flying any flag" - and not those
of ships of any type as in Decree No. 1312-would have been employed, had the Italian law
covered both Italian and foreign vessels. See Decree of July 11, 1915, (No. 1000) 168 GAZ.
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Law of July 8, 1938. 16 That law also did not embody any particular
rule for the Gulf of Taranto, notwithstanding the practice of neutral
powers to extend the limit of their territorial waters to impede
hostilities from occurring in proximity of their coasts.
Legal writers similarly did not include the Gulf of Taranto
among historic bays. In the 1937 issue of the "Rivista del diritto
della navigazione," R. Ago published an article on the limits of Italy's
territorial sea. 17 He did not make any mention of the Gulf of
Taranto. 18 Even G. Cansacchi and R. Sandiford, who devoted special
attention to the problem of the delimitation of the territorial sea,
failed to include the Gulf of Taranto among their list of recognized
historic bays. 19 The same is true for earlier writers such as P.
Fedozzi20 or P. Fiore.21 In the French edition of his manual, P. Fiore
listed the Gulf of La Spezia as an historic bay, but he omitted the
Gulf of Taranto. 22 The Gulf of Taranto is listed as an example of
an historic bay only by the French writer De Cussy. 23
It is worth noting that the problem of historic bays was dealt
with at the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law.2' However, the Italian Government, unlike other delegations, did not make any proposal nor did it claim the territoriality
of the Gulf of Taranto. 25
UFF. ITAL. (July 6, 1915) at 4134, bearing on navigation through the Adriatic Sea and the
blockade of the Adriatic coast.
16. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA.supra note 2,
at 15.
17. Ago, Sui Limiti del Mare Territorial.e, 3 RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO DELLA NAVIGAZIONE
(RIV. DR. NAV.) 370 (1937).
18. Id.
19. Sandiford, supra note 11, at 79; G. CANSACCHI, L'OcCUPAZIONE DEi MARI COSTIERI,
CRITICA DI UNA DOTTRINA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 234 (1936).
20. P. FEDOZZI, I CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, INTRODUZIONE I 359 (1930).
21. P. FIORE, Nuovo DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO SECONDO I BISONGI DELLA CIVILTA
MODERNA 174-75 (1865).
22. P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SUIVANT LES BESOINS DE LA CIVILISATION MODERNE 374 (P. Pradie-Fodere trans. 1868).
23. DE Cussv, PHASES ET CAUSES CELEBRES DU DROIT MARITIME DES NATIONS 97-98 (1856).
On the other hand, the Gulf of Taranto is not listed as an historic bay by T. ORTOLAN, REGLES
INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 151 (4th ed. 1864).
24. League of Nations: Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International
Law: Territorial Waters, III Minutes of the Second Committee, League of Nations Doc.
C. 351(b) M. 145(b) V (1930) [hereinafter cited as Hague Conference of 1930).
25. The Italian representative limited himself to proposing the appointment of a special
committee to study the problem of historic bays. Hague Conference of 1930, supra note 24,
at 112-13.
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B. 1942-1974

In 1942, Italy enacted her Code of Navigation, establishing a
unitary limit for the territorial sea. According to Article 2, the
territorial sea is fixed at six miles. 26 This is the same proviso which
established that bays, the entrance to which is no more than twenty
miles, were to be regarded as falling under Italian sovereignty. 27
The last line of Article 2 established that both the six and the
twenty mile limit could be derogated for special purposes by other
laws or regulations. 28 Since that time, however, the Gulf of Taranto
has not been the object of any such particular law or regulation.
It is well known that the United Nations Secretariat prepared
two studies on historic bays. The first was part of the material submitted to the First Conference on the Law of the Sea; 29 the second
was commissioned by the Conference, after the delegations failed
to reach a suitable definition of an historic bay. 30 Both studies contain a list of historic bays. Neither, however, includes the Gulf of
Taranto. 31 This is perhaps due to the fact that no claim was ever
made by the Italian government over the Gulf, nor was any proposal made to the U .N. Secretariat to include the Gulf of Taranto
under the category of historic bays.
The legal doctrine of the period under review also makes no
mention of the Gulf among the examples of historic bays. Many
examples are found in the manuals of two learned Italian authors
who devoted extensive attention to the problem of the Law of the
Sea and to the question of historic waters: G. Ballad ore Pallieri and
R. Quadri.32 There are also two monographic studies: The Regime
of Bays in International Law (1964) by the Dutch scholar L.J.
Bouchez and Il Regime Giuridico delle Baie e dei Golfi (1970) by the
Italian author F. Lauria. Obviously, these latter two books cite many

26. Article 2 of the Italian Code of Navigation, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS
LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA,
ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957), at 162.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/l, reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
OFFICIAL RECORDS 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as I UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1958)).
30. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143,
reprinted in (1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1.
31. See supra notes 29-30.
32. G. BALLADORE PALLIERI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 425 (8th ed. 1962); R.
QUADRI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 673 (5th ed. 1968).
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examples of historic bays. 33 Neither, however, mentions the Gulf
of Taranto.

c.

1974-1977

The Italian Law of 14 August 1974 (No. 359) amended Article
2 of the Code of Navigation in order to extend the breadth of the
territorial sea to twelve miles and to proclaim Italian sovereignty
over those gulfs or bays whose entrance was no more than twentyfour miles. 34 This law, however, does not embody any particular
proclamation concerning the Gulf of Taranto. The Gulf of Taranto
is mentioned by B. Conforti in the first edition of his manual. 35 Conforti also rejects the territoriality of the Gulf, and concedes that
it might be closed only under the principle of reciprocity. 38 This latter principle refers to states, such as Libya, which have resorted
to enclosing bays without having a valid title. 37
D. 1977-1985

As previously stated, the 1977 Italian Decree proclaimed the
Gulf of Taranto as an historic bay.38 The following elements of state
practice support the Italian claim. First, after the enactment of
Decree No. 816, Italy gave due publicity to the new baseline system,
including the enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto. A chart on which
the baselines were shown, as well as the Decree, were notified to
the states members of the international community. Besides this,
every port authority of the Mediterranean was duly informed by
the Ministry of Merchant Navy of the new delimitation of the Italian
territorial sea. No one challenged the enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto. Further evidence is this statement by the Minister of Defense
before the Italian Parliament in 1982: "[t]he 1977 Italian decision
to consider as internal waters the waters of the Gulf of Taranto
has neither been challenged or questioned by any State." 39
33. See L.J. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LA w (1964); F. LAURIA, IL
REGIME GIURIDICO DELLE BAIE E DEi GOLFI (1970).
34. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2,
at 115.
35. See B. CONFORTI, APPUNTI DELLE LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 219-20 (1976).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. See Atti Parliamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura-Discussioni-Seduta
del 5 Marzo 1982, No. 474 RESOCONTO STENOGRAFICO 25 (1982). The statement by Italy's
Defense Minister was delivered at the time of the Italian Parliament debate over the intrusion of a Soviet submarine into the Gulf of Taranto. See Ronzitti, Sommergibli non Identificati, Pretese Baie Storiche e Contromisure dello Stato Costiero, 66 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 5 (1983).
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Second, on August 24, 1977, Italy and Greece concluded an
agreement for the delimitation of the continental shelf.'° Regarding
apportionment, the agreement applies the median line principle.
Since every point of the line must be equidistant from the nearest
points on the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured, the median line between Italy and Greece was drawn
by taking into account the new baseline along the Ionian coast.
Third, on February 24, 1982, a Soviet submarine intruded into
the Gulf of Taranto. A similar intrusion took place on August 30
of the same year. The Italian Navy tried to intercept the submarine
and Italy protested to the Soviet Union. The Soviet response, however, did not challenge the Italian claim over the Gulf of Taranto.
Rather, the Soviets only claimed that the intruders had not been
Soviet vessels. 41
Fourth, in 1981, Lord Kenneth asked whether the United
Kingdom or NATO recognized the Gulf of Taranto "as Italian
internal or historic waters."'2 In his reply, the Foreign Secretary,
Lord Carrington, stated as follows: "Italy claims the Gulf of Taranto
as internal waters. This is not consistent with our interpretation
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. NATO does
not take a position on the territorial sea limits of its members.'' 43
No protest, however, was conveyed by the United Kingdom to Italy,
nor did the United Kingdom challenge in any other way the
enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto.

III. AN INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE ITALIAN-CLAIM
An historical evaluation and assessment of state practice leads
to the following interim conclusion. The enclosure of the Gulf of
Taranto as an historic bay has met a considerable degree of
acquiescence by third states. This is particularly true if w~ compare the Gulf of Taranto with other recent enclosures such as that
of the Gulf of Sirte, which raised protest from many states and was
challenged twice by the U.S. Navy."
In effect, Italy began to claim sovereign rights over the Gulf
of Taranto only after the entry into force of the 1977 Decree. Before
40. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. LIMITS IN THE SEAS,
No. 96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LIMITS IN THE SEAS].
41. Both incidents are discussed at Ronzitti, supra note 39.

42. 424 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 368 (1981),
43. Id.
44. See Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte Incident (U.S. v. Libya) and International Law, 5
ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 99 (1980-81); Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis ofLibya's
Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 65 (1983). See also infra text accompanying note 66.
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this date it is not possible to trace any significant sign of Italian
sovereignty over the Gulf. The same is true .for legal writers, since
no one, with the single exception of the French author De Cussy,'5
regarded the Gulf as an historic bay. It is worth pointing out,
however, that shortly before the enactment of the 1977 Decree, Italy
had amended the 1942 Code of Navigation by extending the outer
limit of its territorial waters and had proclaimed Italian sovereignty
over those bays whose entrances were no more than twenty-four
miles in length.
It has been rightly pointed out that the 1974 Law amending
the Code of Navigation excludes, by implication, the territoriality
of the Gulf.'6 Had the 1974 Law held that the Gulf was an historic
bay, Italy would still have not made any such proclamation for
another three years. Legal writers who have commented on the
1977 Decree (with the exception of M. Giuliano)'7 hold that the Gulf
of Taranto cannot be classified as an historic bay.'8 On the basis
of the foregoing, therefore, must one conclude that the enclosure
of the Gulf of Taranto is unlawful?

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE PRACTICE
Before addressing this assertion, it must be ascertained
whether the enclosure under review can be justified under a different theory. In the first place, there must be an examination of
whether the norm on historic bays has changed. More specifically,
there must be regard to recent challenges concerning the need for
coastal states to exercise exclusive rights over a long period of time
in order to qualify a bay as "historic."
According to one view, since the entry into force of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone,'9 practice demonstrates how states have enclosed bays without
undue thought to proving the existence of historic roots for the titles
45. See DE CussY, supra note 23, at 94-98.
46. Adam, Un Nuovo Provvedimento in Materia di Linee di Base del Mare Territorial,e
Italiano, 62 RIV. DIR. INT. 479 (1978).
47. Giuliano, Quali Sono i Veri Limiti dell.e Acque territoriali, L'UNITA (Sept.13, 1982)
at 4. The Gulf is also considered an historic bay by Fontana, Le Linee di Base del Mare Territorial.e Italiano, 111 RIVISTA MARITTIMA 78-79 (1978); Bastianelli & Francalanci, Il Diritto
Internazional.e del Maree la Delimitazione della Piattaforma Continental.eltaliana, AGENDA
NAUTICA 11, 18 (1980). The latter do not give a clear indication of the historic titles upon which
the Italian claim is based.
48. See, e.g., B. CONFORTI, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 193 (2d ed.1982); Fusillo,
3 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 570, 574-75 (1977); Adam, supra note 46, at 479-80; L. MIGLIORINO, FONDI
MARINI ED ARMI DI DISTRUZIONE DI MASSA 68 (1980); Francioni, supra note 44, at 99.
49. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1.
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claimed.50 These states have justified their enclosures by underlining economic and defense interests.51 In other words, according to
this theory, state practice has transformed the norm on historic
bays, so that their existence is no longer tied to the exercise of
exclusive rights by the coastal states over a long period of time.
The application of this theory to the Gulf of Taranto has led one
Italian legal writer to the following conclusions: "Whilst the.
classification of the Gulf of Taranto as a historic bay cannot be considered as lawful on the basis of the trends prevailing when the
Geneva Convention was adopted, nevertheless it appears to form
part of the current development in practice." 52
This theory, suggesting that the notion of an historic bay
embodied by Article 7(6) of the Geneva Convention has undergone
a radical change, is faulty on two counts. In the first place, Article
10(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea58 is
drafted using the identical wording as Article 7(6) of the 1958
Geneva Convention.sc Both provisions fail to define the notion of
an historic bay. However, it must not be overlooked that when
Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention was drafted, the drafters.
had in mind the traditional notion of an historic bay.55 Had the
drafters intended a different meaning for the expression "historic
bay" than the one prevalent in 1958, they would certainly have made
it clear; they would have made the content of Article 10(6) different.
In fact, the opinions expressed at the Third Conference on the Law
of the Sea were so varied on the subject of historic bays that no
agreement over a definition was possible.58 Nonetheless the requisite
of prolonged exercise of exclusive rights by the territorial sovereign
was always present in the proposals put forward for the definition
of an historic bay, albeit some states did underline the elements
50. See, e.g., T. KOBAYASHI, THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE OF 1951 AND THE
CHANGING LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 18-19, 32, 57-58 (Univ. Florida Monographs 1965).
51. See T. KOBAYASHI, supra note 50.
52. Fusillo, supra note 48, at 575. For a discussion of the theory to which the customary
norm on historic bays has been changed, see T. KOBAYASHI, supra note 50.
53. See Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 10(6), <Ypenedfor
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. AiCONF .62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21I.L.M.1261, 1272
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention).
54. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6).
55. This may be inferred from the two studies on historic bays drafted by the United
Nations Secretary General, supra•notes 29-30.
56. See M. Nordquist, A Textual History and Commentary on the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Draft Articles 72
(1980) (unpublished diss~rt.ation U. Va. Sch. L.).
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of defense of the coastal state as a justification for the territoriality
of their bays. 57
In the second place, although state practice immediately
preceeding and following the 1958 Geneva Convention shows that
numerous states did not "mince words" when claiming the territoriality of a bay, it must be remembered that their behaviour
raised protests from third states. For example, on July 21, 1957,
the Soviet Union established, by Decree, the enclosure of the Bay
of Peter the Great. 58 The Soviet Decree caused the United States,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and Sweden to protest.59 Some of these
states poin~ed out that the Soviet Union could not claim historic
title and, furthermore, that Soviet arguments based on economic
and defense requirements could not form a valid title for claiming
the territoriality of the Bay.60
Similarly, in 1961 Uruguay and Argentina enclosed the estuary
of the River Plate.81 The United Kingdom and the United States
protested, claiming among other things that the enclosure could
not be justified by Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.82 In
1973 Libya enclosed the Gulf of Sirte.88 Among the protesting States
were the United States and Italy." As is widely known, the United
States did not merely send a note of protest,86 but passed through
the Gulf with a naval squadron. And, in August 1981, the United
States even carried out ·military exercises in the waters claimed
by Libya, with the purpose of demonstrating that the Libyan claims
were without legal ground. 88 Italy also. challenged the Libyan
enclosure on the occasion of the delimitation of the continental shelf
between Malta and Libya. 87 Italy, before the International Court
of Justice, said that she was "unable to accept" Libya's claims over
the Gulf of Sirte.88
57. See c. 2/Blue Paper No. 1 (24 Mar. 1975) reprinted in IV THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LA w OF THE SEA: DoCUMENTS 121 (PlatzOder ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as IV Platzoder); c. 2/Blue Paper No. 3/ Rev. 1 (9 Apr. 1975) reprinted in id. at 125.
58. L. J. BOUCHEZ, supra note 33, at 224-26; Whiteman, IV DIG. INT'L L. 250-58 (1965).
59. See L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 35, at 225-26; Whiteman, supra note 58, at 251-58.
60. See Whiteman, supra note 58.
61. See L.J. BOUCHEZ, supra note 33, at 165.
62. Id. at 165.
63. See A. W. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293-94
(1974).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. During the exercises, two Libyan aircraft were shot down. For comments on the
incident see Francioni, supra note 44, at 85; Spinnato, supra note 44, at 65.
67. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta). Doc. CR 84/1, at 43.
68. See id. For the Italian protest after the Gulf of Sirte enclosure, see the statement

Published by SURFACE, 1984

11

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4

Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com.

286

[Vol. 11:275

V. THE THEORY OF VITAL BAYS
Unconvincing, too, is the theory that a new norm of customary
international law has come into existence regarding historic bays
beside that embodied in both Article 7(6) of the 1958 Convention 69
and Article 10(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. 70 This new norm, it is claimed, admits the lawfulness of
the enclosure of a bay where the coastal state can claim particular
economic and defense interests. 71 If we are to accept this theory
(better known as the "theory of vital bays" 12) the closure of the Gulf
of Taranto would be justified, since strategic needs are far from
indifferent here, due to the presence in the Gulf of one of Italy's
most important naval bases. Nonetheless, the vital bay theory has
absolutely no legal ground in international law, as the following considerations will confirm.
The doctrine of vital bays is not in any way new, and was not
formulated by states born from the process of decolonization during the 1960's, as it has been suggested.73 It was first stated by Captain Storni in 1922, on the occasion of the 31st Conference of the
International Law Association. 74 Storni suggested that a state could
claim the territoriality of a bay in the following two cases: (a) when
there was "un usage continu et seculaire" or (b) "dans les cas ou
les precedents n'existeraient pas ... [the occupation of a bay derives ·
from] une necessite ineluctable." 75 Among the possible necessities
mentioned by Storni were "les necessites de defense." 76 Storni's idea
was taken up by Portugal at the time of the 1930 Hague Conference
on the Codification of International Law. 77 The Portuguese representative pointed out that "if certain States have essential needs ...
those needs are as worthy of respect as usage itself, or even more
so."78
Nonetheless, the doctrine of vital bays did not meet with supof Mr. Bensi, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, before the Italian Parliament on July 8,
1974. He recalled all the representations made by the Italian Government at the time of
the enclosure. Statement of Mr. Bensi, 2 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 422-23 (1976).
69. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, SU]Wa note l, art. 7(6).
70. 1982 Convention, SU]Wa note 53, art. 10(6).
71. See Francioni, SU]Wa note 44, at 98-100.
72. Id. at 98.
73. See II INTERNATIONAL LA w ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE 31ST CONFERENCE 95 (Buenos
Aires 1922).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, su]Wa note 29, at 20.
78. Id. at 20, para. 18.
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port in the decisions of the international tribunals. As long ago as
1917, the Central American Court of Justice, in rendering a decision on the status of the Gulf of Fonseca, confirmed that it was
necessary to examine the characteristics of the bay "from the
threefold point of view of history, geography and the vital interests
of the surrounding States." 79 Therefore, although the Court mentioned the "vital" interests of the state, it did not omit consideration of historic titles. Likewise, in the 1951 Fisheries Case between
Norway and the United Kingdom, the International Court of Justice
concluded that Norway's interests had to be taken into account.
In the Fisheries Case, these interests were not identified with
defense but with economic necessities. 80 The Court, however, also
underlined how "the reality and importance" of these interests were
"clearly evidenced by a long usage." 81
Writers on the subject have made similar observations. In point
of fact, as Y.Z. Blum rightly observes:
the so-called 'vital interests' of the coastal State, taken in isolation, do not appear to have been recognized in the past as a sufficient ground for the acquisition of an historic title, and were relied
upon only in conjunction with all the other considerations which,
through their combination, warrant the inference of an international acquiescence. 82

Blum's observations are confirmed by recent practice of states in
the enclosure of bays or gulfs with an entrance exceeding twentyfour nautical miles, as well as by what transpired from the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea. For example, when Libya
enclosed the Gulf of Sirte she claimed that it was "crucial to the
security of the Libyan Arab Republic." 83 Nonetheless, this Mediterranean state did not fail to underline that "through history and
without any dispute, the Libyan Arab Republic has exercised its
sovereignty over the Gulf." 84
Although the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea con79. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: The Re'JfUblic of El
Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua (Central American Court of Justice 1917), 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 67 4, 700 (1917).
80. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 l.C.J. 116, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951).
81. Id.
82. Y.Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (1965).
83. UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES
RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA, Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/18, at 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as UNITED NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1976)).
84. Id. See Rousseau, Chroni,que des Faits lnternationaux, 18 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R. G. DR. INT. P.) 1096, 1177-78 (1974).
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eluded by repeating Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention,85
it does emerge from the works that no autonomous proposal was
made regarding the institution of vital bays. The Columbian proposal on historic bays gives full consideration to the traditional doctrine, anchored as it is to the prolonged exercise of rights by the
coastal states, and the acquiescence of third states, without ever
referring to vital interests.88 Whenever reference was made to "vital
interests" within the working committee of the Third Conference
(whether for defense or economic purposes), such interests were
never considered in isolation from exclusive rights having been
exercised for "a long" or a "considerable period of time." 87 In other
words, the vital interests of coastal states- such as defense or
economic motives - can in fact be the basis of a claim to exercise
exclusive rights. Only, however, if this exercise has been for "a long"
time, and meets with the acquiescence of third ·s tates, does the title
come into existence.

VI. DRAWING STRAIGHT BASELINES IN JURIDICAL
BAYS
There remains a third way of determining whether the
enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto is lawful. It consists of examining
whether the closing line can be considered a segment of a straight
baseline drawn along the whole coastline of the Ionian Sea, under
Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.88 In order to do this, it
is first necessary to ascertain whether in juridical bays (such as
the Gulf of Taranto) with an entrance exceeding twenty-four nautical
miles, the coastal state is allowed only to draw a straight baseline
within the bay, according to Article 7(5), or whether it can choose
to draw a longer straight baseline, under Article 4. If the answer
is the latter, it will be necessary to ask whether the closing line
of the Gulf meets the requisites set forth by Article 4.
In order to answer the first question, Articles 4 and 7 must
be read together, because vis-d-vis Article 4, Article 7 is 'lex specialis
entitling the coastal state to draw a straight baseline, even if the
crite~ia set forth by Article 4(1) are not met. In those places where
85. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6); (1982 Convention, supra note 53, art. 1066).
86. Draft Articles Concerning the Territorial Sea: Bays the Coasts of Which Belong
to a Single State, Historic Bays or Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/c. 2/L.9, reprint,ed
in V. THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL DoCUMENTS 202
(1976) (hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS Ill OFFICIAL RECORDS (1976)).
87. See IV PlatzOder, supra note 57, at 121, 125.
88. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 4.
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the coast is flat- that is, where it is not deeply indented or cut
into- the coastal state is entitled to enclose a bay if its entrance
is not more than twenty-four nautical miles across, and the bay
meets the semi-circle test. The coastal state is not only entitled to
draw a straight baseline, although the bay penetrates a flat
coastline, it is also entitled to draw the line without meeting the
requirements established in Article 4(2).
If the inlet should happen to be a juridical bay, in that it meets
the semi-circle test, but has an entrance exceeding twenty-four
nautical miles, Article 7 embodies another special proviso vis-d-vis
Article 4. 89 The coastal state may draw a straight baseline of twentyfour nautical miles in length within the bay, although it penetrates
a flat coastline and the straight baseline does not meet the
requirements of Article 4(2). Article 7, however, does not ,s et forth
that a coastal state is necessarily required to observe the specifications outlined herein if it wishes to draw a straight baseline. Even
when the inlet is a juridical bay, the state can draw a straight
baseline according to the criteria established in Article 4(2), if the
inlet penetrates a coast deeply indented and cut into. If this were
not so, the exception embodied in Article 7(6), according to which
the provisions set forth for legal bays would not apply where a
straight baseline is drawn in accordance with the system established
by Article 4, would not have any practical meaning.
It is clear that a coastal state with a coastline which is deeply
indented and cut into will prefer to apply Article 4 rather than
Article 7 if the juridical bay has an entrance exceeding twenty-four
nautical miles. In point of fact, by applying Article 4 the state can
close the whole mouth in such a way that the enclosure takes the
form of a segment of the longer straight baseline which is drawn
along the coastline. This choice, however, does require a price to
be paid: if a straight baseline is drawn within the bay under Article 7, the coastal state is free to adopt a straight baseline of twentyfour nautical miles, even when the closing line does not meet the
conditions laid down in Article 4(2). Furthermore, the waters of the
bay lying landward of the baseline will be subject to the usual
regime of internal waters.90 On the other hand, if the state intends
89. Id. art. 7.
90. Article 7(4) sets forth that the waters within the straight baseline drawn across
a bay "shall be considered as internal waters." Id. art. 7(4). Since this proviso does not contain any reservation (it is not said that art. 5(2) must be applied), the waters within the
bay are "genuine" internal waters. where the right of innocent passage is no longer in force.
See L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 33, at 109-10.
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to close the whole bay, the straight baseline will have to meet the
requirements set forth by Article 4(2). In this -ca.se Article 5(2) will
also apply, requiring the coastal state to grant the tight -of innocent passage in those internal waters which formerly were subject
to either the regime of territorial waters or that of the high sea.
The interpretation of the relationship between Articles 4 and
7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea suggested
here is supported by the opinion of a learned authority 9 ' and is confirmed by the Convention, as well as by state practice. It must not
be overlooked, on the subject of the travaux preparatoires, what
the legal expert of the Secretariat of the Geneva Conference, Pr.ofessor Fran~ois, explicitly stated to be the object of the exception
embodied in Article 7(4) Oater Article 7(6)) on straight baselines:
It covered [stated Fran~ois] the possibility that certain coasts to
which the straight baseline system might be applied contained
bays; in that case the straight baseline would have to be drawn
in such a way as to include- the entire bay in the area of internal
waters. In short, the International Law Commission has considered
that, should a straight baseline be drawn covering the coast of the
bay, the special rules relating to bays would no longer be
applicable.92

This statement by Professor Fran~ois was approved by Denmark,93
and an amendment whereby the exception on historic bays was to
be maintained and the second exception to Article 7 (concerning
eases where the straight baseline system is adopted) was to be
deleted, was withdrawn by the United Kingdom. 94
Regarding state practice, one must recall the instances of
enclosing juridical bays with entrances wider than twenty-four
nautical miles, according to the straight baseline system, which were
carried out after the entry into force of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea. Madagascar has closed the Bay of Antongil with
a 25.9 mile long line. 96 Portugual has drawn a line 31.25 miles long
from Caho Espiehel and Caho de Sines to enclose the inlet into which
the Sado River flows. 96 This could be a juridical bay if the waters
91. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 73, 78-85 (1959).
92. u.N. Doc. A/CO NF. 13/39, reprinted in III UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LA w
OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 147, para. 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as III UNCLOS OFFICIAL
RECORDS (1958)).
93. Id. at 147, para. 2.
94. Id. at 147, para. 3.
95. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 15 (1970).
96. Id.
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of the Sado estuary are included.97 The conduct of the Australian
Government is also illuminating. In a statement delivered on
October 31, 1967, regarding policy over the enclosure of Australian
bays, Mr. Bowen, Commonwealth Attorney-General, stated as
follows:
The Convention [the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone] authorizes the drawing of straight
baselines up to 24 miles in length across bays that meet the criteria
specified in the Convention, and the Government has decided to
apply this principle wherever relevant, around the coasts of
Australia and of the Territories. Three deep indentations around
the Australian coast-Shark Bay, St. Vincent Gulf and Spencer
Gulf- all of which are "bays" under the criteria specified in the
Convention would not be completely enclosed by baselines 24 miles
in length. Shark Bay, at least, is probably already under Australian
sovereignty as an "historic" bay. But in any event the Convention
authorizes the drawing of straight baselines exceeding 24 miles
in length, where a coastline is deeply indented or cut into, provided that no appreciable departure from the general direction of
the coast is involved. Straight baselines will accordingly be drawn
across the entrances to Shark Bay and the two South Australian
Gulfs." 98

VII. THE GULF OF TARANTO CLOSING LINE AS A
SEGMENT OF THE STRAIGHT BASELINE DRAWN
ALONG THE IONIAN COAST
Once it has been established that a state is entitled to enclose
a juridical bay under Article 4, providing it penetrates a coast that
is deeply indented and cut into, it must be ascertained whether the
closing line of the Gulf of Taranto conforms to the criteria set forth
in this proviso. It is important as well to remember that the line
enclosing the Gulf of Taranto can be regarded as a segment of the
longer straight baseline which is about 154 nautical miles long and
which covers a deeply indented coast with six segments.
It is beyond all doubt that three of these segments (Alice
Point-Mouth of the River Neto; Mouth of the River NetoNorthern Cape Colonna; Southern Cape Colonna-Cape Cimiti),
which are all short, do meet the prescriptions of the 1958 Geneva
Convention. Clearly, they do not depart from the general direction
of the coast, as a glance at the charts will show. The same can be
97. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 27 (1970).
98. Mr. Bowen's statement is quoted by Edeson, The Validity of Australia's Possible
Maritime Historic Claims in International Law, 48 AUSTL. L. J. 295, 297 (1974).
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said for the segment from the Allaro Mouth to 37 56' .75-16 05'
.45 (near Cape Spartivento), although the straight baseline in this
instance is rather · longer than the others. This author is of the
opinion that the Cape Rizzuto- Stilaro Mouth (right bank) segment,
which closes the Gulf of Squillace, does not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast and encloses a
relatively small body of water. In short, this Gulf has been closed
according to the 1958 Geneva Convention, and is recognized even
by those who expressed grave doubts as to the conformity of the
Geneva Convention to the system of straight baselines adopted by
Italy under Decree No. 816 (1977). 99 The problem arises over the
segment closing the Gulf of Taranto, which is about 60 miles long,
and which joins the two extremities of the Gulf with a diagonal line.
This enclosure subjects a considerable body of water to the regime
of "internal waters," although it does recede on the western side.
It must not be overlooked that Article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention sets forth two criteria which must be met when drawing
a straight baseline or a segment: (a) the· baseline "must not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast;"
and (b) "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters." 100 Criterion (a), which is in agreement with that
established by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
Case, 101 does not set forth precise limits regarding the length of
baselines. 102 Rather, it is important because it states that the
baseline should not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast.103 The Convention, however, does not
indicate any meaning for the phrase "the general direction of the
coast." It is, however, reasonable to suppose that "the general direction of the coast" in a gulf or bay is represented by the entrance
points of the inlet, or by those promontories closest to the entrance.
If this were not so, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
would not have chosen "the general direction of the coast" as a stan99. See Adam, supra note 48, at 474.
100. Article 4(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone enables the coastal state to take into account "in determining particular
baselines, [the] economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage." 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea, supra note 1, art. 4(4). However, it seems that this method of territorial sea delimitation is not particularly relevant for the Gulf of Taranto, even if one considers the interests
based on fisheries exploitation. See Adam, supra note 46, at 486.
101. Fisheries Case, supra note 80.
102. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 91, at 77.
103. Id.
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dard, but rather would have chosen sinuosity instead. 104 If our
premise on the notion of "the general direction of the coast" is correct, it follows that the baseline for the Gulf of Taranto does not
depart from "the general direction of the coast" to any appreciable
extent. On the contrary, the baseline follows "the general direction of the coast" and even recedes inward towards the West. This
is because instead of drawing a line from Cape Santa Maria di Leuca
to Cape Colonna, Italy has drawn it from Cape Santa Maria di Leuca
to Alice Point.
After the entry into force of the 1958 Geneva Convention,105
state practice shows how the criterion prohibiting departure to any
appreciable extent from "the general direction of the coast" has
been interpreted much more freely than it has been by the Italian
legislature. Suffice it to mention a few examples regarding the
enclosure of gulfs which can be classified as neither juridical bays
nor claimed as historic bays by the coastal states. Apart from the
rather peculiar case of Guinea, which drew a straight baseline of
120 nautical miles, 106 there are many other precedents. When Ireland
's et forth her system of straight baselines, under the 1929 Maritime
Jurisdiction Act, 107 she drew two segments exceeding twenty-four
nautical miles in length. These closed the Bay of Cork (24.25 miles)
and the Bay of Durgavan (25.20 miles). 108 In 1967, Mauritania drew
a straight baseline of eighty-nine nautical miles, enclosing the Banc
d'Arguin. 109 At its furthest point the baseline is 34.2 miles off the
coast. In 1968, Venezuela enclosed the Gulf of the Orinoco River
by a baseline of 98.9 nautical miles. 110 Similarly, Haiti enclosed the
Gulf of Gonave, which has an entrance of ninety-five nautical miles.
The central point of this latter closing line is about fourty nautical
miles from the coast.m Finally, in 1972, Iceland drew a system of
straight baselines with segments which in some points diverge quite
clearly from the general direction of the coastline. An example is

104. See generally, T. GIHL, The Baseline ofthe Territorial Sea, in SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES
IN LAW 121 (1967); Cf. D.H.N. Johnson who writes that baselines drawn across well-defined
bays must be presumed to "follow the general direction of the coast." Johnson, The AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168 (1952).
105. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1.
106. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 40 (1972).
107. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 37 (1970).
108. Id.
109. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 8 (1970).
110. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 21 (1970).
111. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 31 (1970).
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the line joining Geirfuglasker and Eldeyardrangur, which is 70.30
nautical miles. 112
The second criterion which a straight baseline must meet sets
forth that "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters." 113 This is a largely tautological criterion, 114 borrowed from the judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the Fisheries Case 115 and repeated word for word by Article 7(3) of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 116 Although
this criterion agrees with the former in restricting the freedom of
the coastal state, it is not easy to give it a precise significant meaning. In point of fact, if the waters lie within the baselines, they are,
by definition, internal waters.
Two points are raised by the second criterion embodied in
Article 4(2). These two points are similar to those on which the rule
on the enclosure of juridical bays is grounded. 117 The first circumstance is connected with the appurtenance of the waters within
the baseline with the land domain. This is a purely geographical
consideration, proven by the fact that landward waters are lying
within the general direction of the coast. The general direction of
the coast in the Gulf of Taranto is determined by an ideal line from
Cape Santa Maria di Leuca to Cape Colonna. Therefore, since a segment enclosing the bay has been drawn from Cape Santa Maria di
Leuca to Alice Point (which falls within the western side, as has
already been observed), there can be no doubt that the body of
waters within the baseline are lying within the general direction
of the coast.
The second circumstance concerns the reasonableness of the
enclosure. This must be assessed in relation to both the change in
the regime of the waters which takes place because of enclosure,
and to the interests of the coastal state and third states. In the
first place, the navigation interests of third states are to be considered. The importance of the internal waters of the Gulf of
Taranto as a highway of international communication is nil. This
112. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 34 (1974).
113. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note l, art. 4(2).
114. See, e.g., Nordquist, supra note 56, at 43.
115. Fisheries Case, supra note 80, at 133.
116. 1982 Convention, supra note 53, art. 7(3).
117. See Evensen, The Angw-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences, 46
AM. J. INT'L L. 609, 622 (1952); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court
of Justice, 1951-1954: Points of Substantive Law-I: Maritime Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
406-08 (1954); cf. McDoUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 333-36 (1962); Edeson,
Australian Bays, 4 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1968-69).
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is due to the fact that shipping coming from the Sicilian Canal and
bound for the Adriatic or the Aegean Sea (and vice versa) does not
have to cross it-entry into the waters of the Gulf would only waste
time. Nevertheless, should it be deemed necessary, or even only
preferable to enter the Gulf, the regime of innocent passage would
apply.
Second, the interests of third states, which in this case are
scarcely noticeable, should be weighed against those of the coastal
state, which are much more substantial. The most important is the
necessity of defense, more so than economic considerations. 118 The
former made it impossible to delay the enclosure of the Gulf. For
example, military exercises outside territorialwaters but in proximity of the coast could represent an opportunity for planning
strategies in the event of armed conflict. The simple entry and
stoppage of foreign war vessels, whether ships or submarines, could
enable an accurate assessment of coastal defense, and even the placing of military devices. Unless the coastal state can take measures
to preclude a~y such activity, its safety is in peril. It is beyond all
doubt that the enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto has the object of
ensuring Italian defense. One only has to remember that one of the
largest naval bases vital for Italian defense, the strategy of the
NATO southern flank, and Italy's military commitments under the
treaty which binds Italy to guarantee Malta's neutrality, 119 lies
within this bay. Furthermore, the shelter offered by the Ionian
coast, could enable foreign warships or submarines to loiter in the
entrance of the ·Gulf interfering with Italian peacetime military
exercises.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Whereas the characterization of the Gulf of Taranto as an
historic bay under Decree No. 816 (1977) is open to contest, it is
beyond all doubt that the baseline enclosing the entrance to this
bay is in compliance with Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea. 120 It follows that the waters within the
118. As a matter of fact, Italy may acquire exclusive rights over fisheries by the proclamation of an EEZ off the Ionian coast without enclosing the Gulf of Taranto with a system
of straight baselines.
·
119. See the exchange of notes between Italy and Malta of September 15, 1980 which
is discussed in, Ronzitti, Malta's Permanent Neutrality, 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L ..171 (1980-81);
Ronzitti, Lo Scambio di Note Tra Italia e Malta del 15Settembre1980 e i Problemi di Diritto
Internazionale SoUevati Dagli Aspetti Militari del Sistema di Garnzia deUa Neutralit4 Maltese,
in SCRJTTI JN MEMORJA DI DoMENICA BARILLARO 471 (1982).
120. SBe 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 4.
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baseline are internal waters, where the rig~t of innocent passage
must be granted according to Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention. 121 This regime applies to the waters of the Gulf that
were high seas before the enclosure, as well as to those which had
the status of territorial waters before the entry into force of Decree
No. 816 (1977). Since previous to this the baseline of the Gulf was
the low-water mark, this means that in practice the whole body of
the waters of the Gulf is subject to the regime of innocent passage.
While innocent passage can be exercised, overflying the Gulrs
super-adjacent waters is not permitted. In fact, Article 5(2) of the
1958 Geneva Convention 122 mentions the right of innocent passage
in relation only to waters which before the drawing of straight
baselines had the status of territorial or internal waters. Therefore,
as far as the overflight regime is concerned, the status of the waters
of the Gulf of Taranto is equated to that of territorial waters in toto.
Although the closing line of the Gulf of Taranto can be justified
under Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,128 there is nothing
to impede the straight baseline being lawful under a different
theory. That theory is the "historic bays doctrine," provided that
the process which is at present underway lasts long enough to give
birth to an historic title. The 1977 Presidential Decree 124 may be
regarded as the starting point of such a process which will reach
its conclusion only when Italy has exercised exclusive rights over
the Gulf of Taranto without protests and with the acquiescence of
third states.
Finally, practice shows that Italy's exercise of sovereignty over
the Gulf of Taranto has continued without interruption. Italy
asserted its exclusive rights at the time of the Soviet submarine
intrusion. No one, until now, has challenged the Italian claim, not
even the United Kingdom, since Lord Carrington's reply before the
House of Lords is only a parliamentary statement and cannot be
regarded as a true act of protest. Moreover, the new straight
baseline was accepted by Greece at the time of the 1977 Italo-Greek
Treaty on the delimitation of the Continental shelf between the two
countries. 125
121. See id. art. 5(2).
122. Id.
123. Id. art. 4.
124. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
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